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The security features of current digital services are mostly 
defined and dictated by the service provider. A user can always 
decline to use a service whose terms do not fulfil the expected 
criteria, but in many cases even a simple negotiation might 
result in a more satisfying outcome. This article aims at making 
the building of non-repudiable security service level 
agreements between a user and a service provider more 
feasible. The proposed mechanism provides a means to 
describe security requirements and capabilities in different 
dimensions, from overall targets and risks to technical 
specifications, and it also helps in translating between the 
dimensions. A negotiation protocol and a decision algorithm 
are then used to let the parties agree upon the security features 
used in the service. This article demonstrates the feasibility and 
usability of the mechanism by describing its usage scenario 
and proof-of-concept implementation, and analyzes its non-
repudiability and security aspects. 
Introduction 
The number of online services, including cloud computing 
services, has grown drastically. This trend has been accelerated 
by people’s adoption of mobile communication devices into 
their daily lives. These have now become indispensable tools 
as they are used to access online services such as social 
networking, chat tools, email, online banking, and ticket 
reservation agents. Consequently, the number of online 
transactions has also grown drastically, and this has led to an 
increase of security incidents that threaten security and privacy 
in cyber-society. 
Mechanisms to protect users against these risks are needed. 
Though various techniques exist for providing security for 
users, high costs and potential impairment of service usability 
make implementing all of them unrealistic. Users and service 
providers thus wish to strike a balance between security and 
usability, but building unique criteria for defining this balance 
is an impractical approach since the needed security measures 
differ depending on users' circumstances and environments. 
The balance needs to be defined for each user and each 
occasion of service usage. 
Several hurdles stand in the way of realizing such a 
balance. First, users’ security requirements need to be 
described in a machine-readable manner. Structured format for 
that is needed, but that is not enough. It is extremely difficult 
for ordinary users with very little technical knowledge to 
identify needed security techniques, and this is the case with 
many users accessing Internet services via mobile devices. 
They are thus unable to identify needed techniques even if they 
are aware of security risks. We therefore need techniques that 
let such non-technical users specify security requirements. 
Second, we need an automatic negotiation scheme to agree 
upon an SSLA. Users are currently allowed to choose only to 
agree or disagree with the security policies proposed by service 
providers and have no means to negotiate needed security 
levels and/or techniques with the provider. Even if the provider 
wishes to negotiate with users, manual negotiation is 
impractical in terms of cost, so an automatic negotiation 
scheme is needed. Third, the agreement needs to be non-
repudiable for the negotiation parties. No matter how amenably 
a user and service provider agree upon the needed level of 
security, security incidents may eventually occur. If an incident 
stems from a violation of the agreement, one party may wish to 
sue the other. Thus, the agreed level of security needs to be 
non-repudiable for both parties. 
To address the above issues and realize a balance between 
usability and security, this article introduces a mechanism that 
builds a non-repudiable security service level agreement 
(SSLA). An SSLA is the information on a service’s security 
level agreed to by a user and service provider. The mechanism 
provides two techniques – security expression and translation. 
Security expression technique provides a means to describe 
security requirements and capabilities in multiple dimensions 
and in a machine-readable format. Translation technique 
provides a means to translate such information among different 
dimensions, which enables users with little technical 
knowledge to express security requirements with non-technical 
vocabulary and translate them into technical vocabulary. These 
techniques are used by the mechanism’s negotiation protocol 
that enables the user and service provider to negotiate and 
agree to an SSLA. This enables service providers providing 
only yes-or-no choices to users on certain security policies to 
interact with users to set up agreeable level of security policies. 
The negotiation generates a non-repudiable SSLA by using 
cryptographic identities and digital signatures. 
This article also demonstrates the usability and feasibility 
of the proposed mechanism by providing a usage scenario and 
proof-of-concept implementation, and then analyzes the 
mechanism. 
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Key Challenges 
To build a mechanism that generates a non-repudiable 
SSLA, a range of issues need to be considered. There are 
related works for each of the issues, and they are good basis for 
considering the mechanism. 
Machine-Readable Security Expression 
Security requirements need to be expressed in a machine-
readable manner in order to negotiate the SSLA over the 
Internet. One approach for this is using a structured language, 
such as XML or JSON, along with its schema. The WS-
Agreement specification [1] provides an XML schema for 
specifying an agreement and the language in which advertising 
of service capabilities are performed. While it is intended for 
making business-based agreements, it should also be possible 
to use it for defining security-specific agreements, based on the 
extensibility of XML. Policy languages may also be used to 
express different types of requirements of the parties. WS-
Policy [2] is one such language and it can be used along with 
other WS-* specifications – namely WS-Security [3], WS-
Trust [4], and WS-SecureConversation [5] – to express the 
required security functionality for the established 
communication. These solutions, however, incur considerable 
overhead, as with many other XML-based solutions. 
Even if we have a means to express security requirements 
in a machine-readable manner, several issues still exist. First, it 
is difficult to prepare a single schema for describing user 
requirements. Users with differing level of technical 
knowledge may wish to specify security requirements with 
different vocabularies or in different viewpoints. Users and 
service providers also have different viewpoints, so users wish 
to express security in terms of non-technical terms to broaden 
the scope of protection, while service providers do this in terms 
of specific technical terms to minimize the scope of 
responsibility. Second, allowing free text strings may hinder 
the automation of SSLA processing and negotiation. The 
proposed mechanism thus takes an approach that allows 
multiple dimensions of such a description, prohibits free text 
strings, and provides a means to translate between the 
dimensions. 
Negotiation and Agreement-Building Protocol 
Negotiation needs to take place in order for two parties to 
agree on an SSLA. There is a good amount of existing research 
regarding the creation of SLAs. Quality of service (QoS) is one 
prominent application domain, and Hasselmayer et al. [6] 
suggest an architecture in the spirit of Web Services (WS) and 
apply grid technologies for the implementation. This basically 
provides discovery mechanisms for the multitude of service 
providers and XML templates for the presentation of the 
service offer – i.e., the SLA to be formed – which the client can 
accept or refuse. It also uses the WS-Agreement specification 
[1] for the actual protocol and the language in which the 
advertising of service capabilities is conducted. 
Another approach for agreements is key exchange 
protocols, such as TLS [7], IKEv2 [8], and HIP [9]. Key 
exchange protocols provide a means to agree upon actual 
communication security parameters, and can also be modified 
to exchange the SLA type of data. Alternatively, they can be 
made to support the above XML-based specifications. HIP 
provides flexible mechanisms for protocol additions, but it is 
not a widespread protocol and has its own constraints regarding 
the amount of exchanged data. IKEv2 allows the possibility of 
defining new security associations, but as with TLS the original 
specifications still need to be modified. TLS, however, enjoys 
the most widespread deployment. 
Based on the above works, we have developed a 
negotiation protocol that can cope with the vocabulary gap 
between a user and service provider.  
Non-repudiable Proof of Agreement 
Non-repudiability in the SSLA negotiation context means 
that, at a minimum, it should be impossible for either party to 
refute the negotiation result. This may also concern the 
negotiation process itself in that any statement made during the 
negotiation cannot be refuted afterward. For the sake of 
fairness, both parties should retain the same amount of proof in 
order to avoid situations where one party holds a 
preponderance of proof [10]. The proposed negotiation 
protocol addresses the above issue by producing non-
repudiable proofs with cryptographic identities and digital 
signatures. 
Architecture 
This section introduces the architecture of the proposed 
mechanism and elaborates on the roles needed by the 
architecture and on the process.  
Roles 
The proposed mechanism defines three roles – User, 
Service Provider (SP), and Knowledge Base (KB). User wishes 
to use an online service. It is aware of the high-level security 
requirements for the use of such services and activates the 
negotiation of an SSLA with the SP. The requirements differ 
depending on the target online service and any other 
circumstances of the user. Note that it can also express security 
capabilities if needed. Service Provider (SP) provides online 
services to Users. It knows what security measures it can 
provide and which user requirements it may satisfy by 
consulting the KB. Note that it can also express security 
requirements if needed. Knowledge Base (KB) provides 
knowledge concerning security upon request. It administrates 
and maintains dictionaries of security expressions in differing 
dimensions and translation tables between the dimensions. 
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Process Overview 
Figure 1 gives a simplified overview of the proposed 
mechanism, which provides a means for users to describe 
security requirements from various dimensions. It translates 
such requirements in various dimensions into requirements in a 
single dimension. It then negotiates the requirements and 
capabilities of both of the user and service provider and agrees 
upon the needed security requirements of the service, i.e., the 
SSLA. The sequence of the procedure is conducted 
automatically without manual intervention. The SSLA is also 
built so that it becomes non-repudiable.  
Fundamental Techniques 
Several techniques are needed to realize the architecture. 
Indeed, security requirements and capabilities need to be 
described in a machine-readable manner and translated into 
arbitrary dimensions in order for a User and SP to negotiate a 
non-repudiable SLA. This section introduces four such 
techniques. 
Security Expression 
An SSLA is the information on the agreed to security level 
between a User and SP. In order to build an SSLA, the 
proposed mechanism defines two types of security information: 
security requirement and capability. Security requirement is 
the information on what kind of security or security measure 
one party requires while capability is the information on what 
kind of security or security measures one party can provide. An 
SSLA is built through matching and negotiation of security 
requirements and capabilities of both a User and SP. The 
vocabulary for describing such information is stored inside 
dictionaries, which are stored inside KBs. To facilitate machine 
processing the proposed mechanism minimizes the room for 
free text input by assigning unique identifiers for each 
vocabulary item. The identifiers are expressed as Object 
Identifiers (OIDs) [11] 
The vocabulary that Users and SPs wish to use differs. To 
facilitate the expression of security requirements and 
capabilities for various users, the mechanism defines four 
dimensions of such information – Target, Risk, Function, and 
Technique – and provides separate types of dictionaries. 
Target dimension expresses them from the standpoint of what 
to protect by specifying the target of the protection, such as 
user’s “personal information.” The vocabulary in this 
dimension is stored in the “Target” dictionary. Risk dimension 
expresses them from the standpoint of what types of risks to 
avoid by specifying risks that need to be avoided, such as the 
risk of “network sniffing.” The vocabulary in this dimension is 
stored in the “Risk” dictionary. Function dimension expresses 
them from the standpoint of what types of functions need to 
implemented by specifying needed security functions, such as 
“user data encryption” and “user authentication.” The 
vocabulary in this dimension is stored in the “Function” 
dictionary. Technique dimension expresses them from the 
standpoint of which technique an SP needs to implement by 
specifying needed security techniques, such as “AES” and 
“SHA.” The vocabulary in this dimension is stored in the 
“Technique” dictionary. 
requirements capabilities
Target
Risk
Function Technique
User SP
input input
negotiation
translation
non-repudiable non-repudiable
SP sideUser side
SSLA
Figure 1 Process Overview 
Figure 2 Excerpt of Example Target Dictionary 
target
1. person
2. information
3. physical
    asset
1.1 morals
1.2 knowledge
1.3 intellectual property right
1.4 others
3.1 devices
3.2 system
3.3 communication channel
3.4 service
3.5 others
2.1.1 publicly available information
2.1.2 non-disclosure information
2.2.1 publicly available information
2.2.2 non-disclosure information
2.1.2.1 email
2.1.2.2 personalized web
2.1.2.3 others
2.2.2.1 authentication information
2.2.2.2 user data
2.2.2.3 privacy information
2.2.2.4 others
2.1 incoming
      information
2.2 outgoing
      information
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Vocabularies in these dictionaries of different dimensions 
begin with TARGET, RISK, FUNCTION, and TECHNIQUE – 
each assigned unique OID arcs. Since users and service 
providers typically have multiple security requirements and 
capabilities, the security requirement, capability, and SSLA are 
indeed expressed as the list of these OIDs. Each KB may have 
its own dictionaries. To demonstrate the construction of these 
dictionaries, Figures 2 and 3 show excerpts of Target and Risk 
dictionary examples. The numbers in the figures are preceded 
by the OID arcs specifying the types of the dictionaries: 
TARGET, RISK, FUNCTION, and TECHNIQUE.  
We sometimes wish to express security by using 
vocabulary of multiple dimensions. We can combine arbitrary 
OIDs in differing dimensions by using colons. For instance, we 
wish to specify a function to cope with a specific risk. In this 
case, we can concatenate OIDs of function and risk by using a 
colon between them, e.g., “Risk.1.1.2:Function.19.12.2.” This 
feature is useful especially when counter-proposing an SSLA.  
Translation 
By providing differing dimensions of security expressions, 
users can express security from various dimensions so they do 
not fail to identify important security requirements. Though 
various types of users may enjoy this feature, a technique to 
translate information from one dimension into another is 
needed in order to process information of differing dimensions. 
The proposed mechanism provides a technique for such 
translation. It looks up translation tables, which map an OID of 
one dimension to corresponding OIDs of differing dimensions. 
The tables are stored inside KBs. 
 Three types of translation tables exist: [target, risk], [risk, 
function], and [function, technique]. The tables basically have 
two columns. Typically an OID of one column corresponds to 
multiple OIDs of another column. The [risk, function] 
translation table, for instance, have two columns – one for 
OIDs of risks and another for the ones of functions. The table 
has multiple entries for one risk with differing functions since 
several functions are required to cope with a certain risk. Table 
1 shows excerpts of example translation tables. 
Negotiation protocol 
 The security expression and translation techniques are 
useful for a User and SP negotiating an SSLA since Users often 
wish to express security requirements with non-technical 
vocabulary while SPs often wish to agree upon an SSLA using 
specific technical vocabulary. The mechanism defines two 
types of communication: KB lookup and SSLA negotiation. 
KB lookup is performed to translate requirements and 
capabilities of various dimensions. It uses Translation-request 
and -reply messages. Users and SPs can query KBs to translate 
requirements and capabilities in one dimension into another by 
sending a Translation-request that includes them. The KBs 
reply with a Translation-reply message that contains the 
translated requirements and capabilities. 
SSLA negotiation takes place to build an SSLA between 
two parties. SSLA-proposal and -confirmation messages are 
used. One of the parties sends an SSLA-proposal message that 
contains its requirements and capabilities, and the other party 
replies with an SSLA-confirmation message if it agrees to 
satisfy the requirements. If it disagrees, it can generate new 
requirements considering the received capability and reply with 
new SSLA-proposal message. This message exchange 
target Risk  risk function 
Target.1.1.1 Risk.2.3.4  Risk.1.1.1 Function.12.1.3 
 Risk.3.2.3   Function.17 
Target.1.1.2 Risk.2.2.5   Function.23.3 
 Risk.2.3.2  Risk.1.1.2 Function.15 
 Risk.3.1.3   Function.19.12.2 
Table 1 Excerpts of example translation tables 
(a) [target, risk] table                      (b) [risk, function] table 
 
 
       
Figure 3 Excerpt of Example Risk Dictionary 
risk
2.1.1 unauthorized access
2.1.2 impersonation
2.1.3 network sniffing
2.1.4 others
1.2.3.3 others
1.2.3 system mis-usage
1.2.4 others
1.2.1 Vulnerability mis-management
1.2.2 configuration　mis-management
1.2 system mis-management
1.3 others
3.1 unauthorized access
3.2 data/information incident
3.3 service suspension
3.4 interoperability
3.5 others
2.1 information theft
2.2 service suspension
2.4 others
2.3 user right infringement
1. caused by
    user
2. caused by
    third party
3. caused by 
    service
    provider
1.1 data mis-management
1.2.3.2 software license
            violation
1.2.3.1 mistyping
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continues until one party replies with an SSLA-confirmation 
message or cancels the negotiation. The negotiation is 
terminated when the SSLA-confirmation message has reached 
its recipient. The list of agreed requirements becomes an SSLA. 
Though multi-round negotiation may take place, for 
simplicity, Figure 4 describes simple one-round negotiation. 
Note that KBU and KBSP are the KBs that the User and SP 
trust respectively. Prior to initiating negotiation, a User 
communicates with KBU to translate security requirements in 
differing dimensions into the Function dimension. The User 
then sends an SSLA-proposal message that contains the 
requirements and optionally the URI of KBU. Upon receiving 
the message, the SP considers whether it can satisfy the 
proposed requirements and wishes to specify requirements in 
Technique dimension rather than Function dimension so that 
the requirements can be more specific on its responsibility. It 
thus communicates with KBSP to know the techniques that 
satisfy the User’s requirements. It then constructs a new SSLA-
proposal message that contains the list of techniques and 
optionally the URL of KBSP. Upon receiving the message, the 
User checks whether the techniques can satisfy its requirements 
by communicating with KBU. Once that is confirmed, it sends 
an SSLA-confirmation message to the SP. Note that in this 
example the security requirement sent from the User at the 
beginning of the negotiation is described in the Function 
dimension while the SSLA that is agreed to at the end is 
described in the Technique dimension. 
The messages of the negotiation protocol use 
cryptographic identities and digital signatures to make the 
resultant SSLA non-repudiable. The SSLA-proposal message 
contains the list of requirements and capabilities, the identities 
of the negotiating parties, negotiation ID, nonce, timestamps, 
signature, and proof-of-work token. The identities should be 
linked to the public keys of the participants, such as through a 
one-way hash function of the public key or a certificate. The 
negotiation ID, which remains the same for the entire 
negotiation, and nonce protect the sender from replay attacks. 
The message is signed with the private key corresponding to 
the sender’s public key. The proof-of-work token was 
generated by using a hashcash stamp [12]. The generation of 
the stamp requires the sender to commit a parametrizable 
amount of computation work, and thus contributes to 
minimizing the risk of DoS attacks. The SSLA-confirmation 
message contains the contents of the SSLA-proposal message. 
It also contains the sender’s signature and nonce as well, as 
with the SSLA-proposal message. 
When the SSLA-confirmation message reaches its 
recipient, both sender and recipient have the list of 
requirements, i.e., the SSLA, with their signatures. In this way, 
both parties hold the same information that is usable as a proof. 
Decision Algorithm 
When an SSLA-proposal message is sent, the recipient 
needs to decide whether to accept it, create a counterproposal, 
or abort the negotiation, as we have seen above. This decision 
could be performed by manual operation, but this should be 
automated in order for an SP to handle a high volume of Users. 
One simple approach is that the recipient accepts the 
proposal if it has sufficient capability, as described in 
Algorithm 1, where req represents an entry of the requirements, 
caps represents the capabilities, the dimension subroutine 
returns the dimension of its argument, and the translate 
subroutine translates its argument into one of the dimensions, 
and that is performed by the above KB lookup procedure. The 
algorithm returns either 1 or 0, where 1 means that the caps can 
satisfy the req and thus are sufficient as SSLA entries. The 
algorithm needs to be executed for each entry of the 
requirements. 
Algorithm 1 begins with a branch on the condition. If req 
is described in the Technique dimension, it is simply compared 
with the list of capabilities. If it matches one entry of caps, the 
algorithm returns 1. If req is described in a non-Technique 
dimension, it is translated into translated-reqs that are 
described in the Function dimension. Note that the translation 
if{dimension(req)=Technique} then 
if{req ∈ caps} then 
return 1 
else 
return 0 
end if 
else 
translated-reqs <- Translate(req, Function) 
for all entry in translated-reqs do 
if entry ∉ Translate(caps, Function) then 
return 0 
end if 
end for 
return 1 
end if 
 
Algorithm 1 Simple decision algorithm 
 
Figure 4 One-round Negotiation Sequence 
Translation-request
(in various dimensions)
KBU User SP KBSP
Translation-reply
(in Function dimension)
SSLA-proposal
(in Function dimension)
Translation-request
(in Function dimension)
Translation-reply
(in Technique dimension)
SSLA-proposal
(in Technique dimension)
Translation-request
(in Technique dimension)
Translation-reply
(in Function dimension)
SSLA-confirmation
(in Technique dimension)
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subroutine can convert one requirement into several 
requirements in a different dimension. Each entry of the 
translated-reqs is compared with the list of capabilities that are 
translated from the Technique dimension to the Function 
dimension. If all entries of the translated-reqs match the 
capabilities, the algorithm returns 1. 
In cases where some or none of the requirements are 
satisfied by the caps, the recipient cannot accept the SSLA 
proposal. It can then counter-propose another SSLA or cancel 
the negotiation. If the negotiation is cancelled, the sender could, 
for instance, change req and redo the procedure. 
Discussion and Analysis 
This section demonstrates the mechanism’s usability and 
feasibility by discussing its usage scenario and by introducing 
our proof-of-concept implementation respectively. It also 
analyses the mechanism’s non-repudiability and security 
features. 
Usage Scenario 
One usage scenario of the mechanism is that a user of a 
mobile device wishes to use a hotspot service provided by a 
service provider. The user stipulates its security requirements 
and capabilities, negotiates with the service provider, and 
finally receives the service. The detailed process is elaborated 
below. 
The user is required to input his credit card information for 
settlement in order to use the service. Nevertheless, the user 
fears that the information can be leaked or mistreated, so he 
chooses the risk of “network sniffing” and “data 
mismanagement” from the Risk dictionary and stipulates their 
OIDs. Prior to the negotiation, he communicates with his 
trusted KB that translates them, and receives the translated 
OIDs that indicate that “stored data encryption,” 
“communication data encryption,” “authentication,” and 
“complete data removal after usage” are the needed functions. 
Now he is ready to begin an SSLA negotiation with the service 
provider and sends the OIDs of his security requirements to the 
provider. At the same time, he sends OIDs of his capabilities 
that include the “S/Key” authentication capability. 
Upon receiving the OIDs, the provider considers whether 
it can satisfy the requirements. The requirements are somewhat 
vague for the provider, thus it wishes to agree upon the SSLA 
in more concrete dimension. It then asks its trusted KB, which 
replies with the OIDs of techniques that can satisfy the 
requirements in case of the first three requirements. The 
provider then looks up the capabilities it received from the user 
since some techniques requires the user to have some 
capabilities. In case of the third requirement, for instance, the 
provider decides to use the “S/Key” technique since it is 
included in the list of techniques suggested by the KB and is 
also included in the user’s capability list. Regarding the fourth 
requirement “complete data removal after usage,” the KB 
replies without any translation, meaning that the requirement is 
already concrete enough and the provider can satisfy that. Now 
the provider is ready to counter-propose a more concrete SSLA 
that satisfies the user’s requirements. 
The provider responds to the user with the list of 
techniques that are concatenated with the original requirements 
with colons. Upon receiving the answers, the user checks 
whether the techniques can satisfy his requirements by 
requesting translation from the trusted KB. Once he has 
confirmed that the proposed techniques can satisfy the 
requirements, he sends the confirmation message to the 
provider. In this case, the list of techniques becomes the SSLA. 
Now the user is ready to use the service. 
Proof-of-Concept Implementation 
A proof-of-concept implementation was made to verify the 
feasibility of the proposed mechanism. It was implemented as a 
REST-based service with Java using JAX-RS API [13] and 
BouncyCastle cryptographic [14] libraries. The requirements, 
capabilities, and SSLA contents were described as JSON 
objects that contain the list of security expression identifiers in 
OID format. 
The resource identifiers in the service were derived from 
the hashcash stamp, which forms a unique identifier for each 
negotiation if it includes the MAC, identities of both 
negotiation parties, and a random nonce. The implementation 
used hashcash’s extension field and included these items of 
information by defining its own information structure. 
The hashcash protocol needs to know the puzzle’s 
difficulty, and the timestamp’s granularity before the 
connection establishment. Therefore, some values should be 
used as the default. The implementation sets a default stamp 
difficulty at a 12 bit collision. It took computing resources in 
the order of 10-30 milliseconds (depending on the used SHA-1 
implementation) using a Python-based implementation for 
generating a hashcash stamp [15]. 
The service was able to generate a non-repudiable SSLA 
through negotiation, and that demonstrates the feasibility of the 
mechanism. Note that the source code of the implementation is 
available online [16]. 
Non-repudiability consideration 
The mechanism should be able to resolve any dispute 
about a committed transaction solely based on the signatures of 
the transaction participants, and it should not have to rely on 
the existence of a third party for dispute resolution. It is 
obvious that our proposed mechanism can achieve that since 
the negotiation is taken place directly between a User and SP 
without any third party, and their signatures verify the contents 
of the SSLA. It indeed imitates the traditional process of 
negotiating about the contents of the agreement and finally 
mutually signing two copies of a paper that defines the contract, 
one for each party. 
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It is desirable that the fairness of negotiation is guaranteed. 
That is, none of the parties should be able to gain any 
advantage for having some partial evidence. Achieving the 
fairness is extremely complicated in the digital world, and the 
proposed mechanism is unable to guarantee that entirely. For 
instance, each party can propose a contract, but as one of them 
initiates the negotiation offering, the other might be considered 
to have a slight advantage. In particular, one party ends up in 
the possession of a signed agreement before the other. 
Sending a signed SSLA proposal to the SP may not 
normally be of any concern to the User, since the User might 
not start using the service before having received a signed 
SSLA from the SP. We may, however, imagine some rare cases 
where a mismatch in the synchronization of a series of 
negotiation attempts would make it possible for one party to 
exploit a misunderstanding of the other party on the security 
level applied on the service. 
There are various solutions for this synchronization 
problem, e.g., the user of the service may require an explicit 
reference to the applied SSLA, or it may be required that the 
parties always follow the latest agreed SSLA in the transactions. 
Security Considerations 
The SSLA negotiation imposes non-lightweight tasks to 
the communication parties. Thus it needs to consider DoS 
resistance feature. DoS attacks make one or more resources 
that a service offers to its legitimate users inaccessible to them. 
The attacker in DoS attacks commonly depletes finite resources, 
such as computational power, communication bandwidth, and 
the ability to maintain state. An attacker can, as a basic rule, 
cause a DoS attack on any service if the attack is distributed 
and powerful enough, but shortcomings and weaknesses in 
protocols and services can make attackers’ tasks easier. For 
instance, the target service usually cannot discern the attacker 
from the legitimate users, and the attacker can make an 
overwhelming amount of normal requests consuming all the 
resources. Therefore, DoS resistance usually means that an 
attack is not possible without considerable effort on the 
attacker’s part. If the attacker has to commit more resources 
than the defending party, the economies of the situation support 
the defender. 
Protocols basically need proof that the other party is 
committed to the transaction before any heavy work or any 
types of resource allocation can be performed in order to be 
DoS-resistant. This proof also needs to be verified with little 
effort. Different kinds of proofs of commitment can be made; 
some are computational while others may rely on other factors, 
for instance on the communication party’s ability to 
communicate and maintain a state. 
The proposed protocol requires the SP to perform multiple 
computations including matching between requirements and 
capabilities upon receiving the first message of the protocol 
from the User. It thus needs to consider a DoS resistance 
feature. It factors that in and uses a hashcash stamp [12]. This 
constitutes a proof-of-work that takes a parameterizable 
amount of work to compute for the sender. The recipient can 
efficiently verify the received hashcash stamps. This induces a 
performance penalty on the initiator, hence mitigating DoS 
from the server’s perspective. The use of hashcash in the 
protocol makes it resistant against DoS, and that DoS-resistant 
feature is needed for the protocol since creating the SSLA is a 
non-trivial effort for the SP. 
A signature in the user's first packet would also be useful 
for DoS-prevention purposes, at least if RSA signatures are 
used. There is then the possibility of even removing the 
hashcash stamp. Indeed, since RSA signature verification is 
much faster than signature generation, with the usual public 
exponents a valid signature could serve as a proof of 
commitment. While checking RSA signatures is not as fast as 
hashcash puzzle validation, the signature would also serve the 
other purposes: as a proof of the ownership of the public key, 
and as a signature for the final SSLA. 
There are many security aspects apart from DoS resistance 
feature. Though they are not particularly mentioned in this 
article, many existing techniques can be used to reinforce its 
security feature. For instance, the use of message 
authentication codes and signatures guarantees that our 
mechanism protects the parties from typical security threats, 
such as message interception and modification, and replay 
attacks. It can also prevent the message sender from denying 
the sending of a message. The mechanism can also ensure the 
confidentiality of transactions, whenever the nature of the 
agreement requires confidentiality, by implementing various 
schemes, such as JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [17]. 
Conclusion and Future Works 
The proposed mechanism builds non-repudiable SSLA by 
using its security expression technique, translation technique, 
negotiation protocol, and decision algorithm. The usage 
scenario and the proof-of-concept implementation clarified the 
usability and feasibility of the mechanism, and the discussion 
section analysed its non-repudiability and DoS resistance 
features. One major issue for further work is how to 
automatically identify security requirements and capabilities of 
users. This is especially an important issue for users of mobile 
tablets since their user interface including display and input 
devices are limited. Moreover, the requirements and 
capabilities may change dynamically depending on 
circumstances including the hotspot services the users uses and 
the remaining amount of battery. Through continuing this 
research, we believe we contribute to realize tailored security 
that is secure and usable. 
Author Information 
Takeshi Takahashi (takeshi_takahashi@ieee.org): received a 
Ph.D. in telecommunication from Waseda University in 2005. 
He worked for the Tampere University of Technology in 2002-
This is a preprint version of our article posted to IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine. DOI: 10.1109/MVT.2013.2269188 
 
2004 as a researcher and Roland Berger Ltd. in 2005-2009 as 
a business consultant. Since 2009, he has been working for the 
National Institute of Information and Communications 
Technology and is currently a senior researcher there. His 
research interests include Internet security and network 
protocols. 
Joona Kannisto (joona.kannisto@tut.fi): received an M.Sc 
from Tampere University of Technology in 2011. He is a 
researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the university and has been 
involved in security related research ever since. His research 
interests include secure protocols, usable security, and 
reputation and trust management. 
Jarmo Harju (jarmo.harju@tut.fi): received a Ph.D. in 
mathematics from the University of Helsinki in 1984. In 1985 - 
1989 he was a senior researcher at the Technical Research 
Center of Finland. In 1989 - 1995 he was a professor at 
Lappeenranta University of Technology. Since 1996 he has 
been a professor of telecommunications at Tampere University 
of Technology, where he is leading a research group 
concentrating on network architectures and network security. 
Seppo Heikkinen (seppo.heikkinen@tut.fi): received a Ph.D. 
from Tampere University of Technology in 2011. He worked 
for Finnish telecom operators in 1997-2005 and in 2006-2012 
as a researcher at the university concentrating on network 
security. He currently works for Nixu Ltd. as a security 
consultant with emphasis on PCI DSS compliance. His 
research interests include payment security, future network 
security architectures, identity-based security, and non-
repudiation mechanisms. 
Bilhanan Silverajan (bilhanan.silverajan@tut.fi): received an 
M.Sc from Lappeenranta University of Technology in 1998. He 
is completing his PhD at Tampere University of Technology. 
Since 1998 he has been actively involved with scientific 
research and project management of national as well as EU-
wide collaboration projects for future Internet architectures, 
network and device mobility, pervasive middleware, home 
networks, and ubiquitous services, as well as the Internet of 
Things. 
Marko Helenius (marko.t.helenius@tut.fi): received a Ph.D 
from University of Tampere in 2002. He joined Tampere 
University of Technology in 2008 as a senior researcher. His 
current research interests include usable security, secure 
programming and cloud security. 
Shin’ichiro Matsuo (smatsuo@nict.go.jp): received a D.E. 
degree in 2003 from Tokyo Institute of Technology. In 1996-
2009, he worked for NTT DATA Corporation. Since 2009 he 
has been working for the National Institute of Information and 
Communications Technology and is currently a director there. 
His research interests include information security and 
cryptographic protocols. 
References 
[1] A. Andrieux, K. Czajkowski, A. Dan, K. Keahey, H. Ludwig, T. 
Nakata, J. Pruyne, J. Rofrano, S. Tuecke, and M. Xu, Web 
services agreement specification (wsagreement), Open Grid 
Forum Std., Mar. 2007. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.107.pdf 
[2] S. Bajaj, D. Box, D. Chappell, F. Curbera, G. Daniels, P. Hallam-
Baker, M. Hondo, C. Kaler, D. Langworthy, A. Nadalin, N. 
Nagaratnam, H. Prafullchandra, C. von Riegen, D. Roth, J. 
Schlimmer, C. Sharp, J. Shewchuk, A. Vedamuthu, U. Yalcinalp, 
and D. Orchard, Web Services Policy 1.2 - Framework (WS-
Policy), W3C Std., Apr. 2006. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.w3.org/Submission/WS-Policy/ 
[3] A. Nadalin, C. Kaler, R. Monzillo, and P. Hallam-Baker, Web 
Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1, OASIS Std., Feb. 
2006. [Online]. Available: https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/download.php/16790/ 
[4] A. Nadalin, M. Goodner, M. Gudgin, A. Barbir, and H. Granqvist, 
WSTrust 1.3, OASIS Std., Mar. 2007. [Online]. Available: 
http://docs.oasisopen.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3-
os.doc 
[5] A. Nadalin, M. Goodner, M. Gudgin, A. Barbir, and H. Granqvist, 
WS-SecureConversation 1.3, OASIS Std., Mar. 2007. [Online]. 
Available: http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
secureconversation/v1.3/ws-secureconversation.html 
[6] P. Hasselmeyer, H. Mersch, B. Koller, H.-N. Quyen, L. Schubert, 
and P. Wieder, “Implementing an SLA Negotiation Framework,” 
in Proceedings of the eChallenges e2007 Conference, 2007. 
[7] T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
Protocol Version 1.2,” RFC 5246 (Proposed Standard), Internet 
Engineering Task Force, Aug. 2008, updated by RFCs 5746, 
5878, 6176. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt 
[8] C. Kaufman, P. Hoffman, Y. Nir, and P. Eronen, “Internet Key 
Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2),” RFC 5996 (Proposed 
Standard), Internet Engineering Task Force, Sep. 2010, updated 
by RFC 5998. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5996.txt 
[9] R. Moskowitz, P. Nikander, P. Jokela, and T. Henderson, “Host 
Identity Protocol,” RFC 5201 (Experimental), Internet 
Engineering Task Force, Apr. 2008, updated by RFC 6253. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5201.txt 
[10] S. Heikkinen, S. Siltala, “Service Usage Accounting,” Vehicular 
Technology Magazine, IEEE , vol.6, no.1, pp.60,67, Mar. 2011. 
[11] International Telecommunication Union, “Information 
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Procedures for the 
operation of Object Identifier Registration Authorities: General 
procedures and top arcs of the International Object Identifier 
tree,” X.660, 2011. 
[12] (2013, Apr.) Hashcash. [Online]. Available: http://hashcash.org/ 
[13] P. Sandoz and M. Hadley, “JAX-RS: Java API for RESTful Web 
Services Version 2.0,” JSR-339, Java Community Process, May. 
2013. 
[14] (2013, Apr.) Bouncy Castle crypto APIs. The Legion of the 
Bouncy Castle. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bouncycastle.org/ 
[15] D. Mertz, “Charming Python: Beat spam using hashcash,” Nov, 
2004, [Online]. Available: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/ 
linux/library/l-hashcash/index.html 
[16] (2013, June.), Security SLA Negotiation tools. [Online]. 
Available: https://github.com/securitySLAnegotiation/ 
[17] M. Jones, E. Rescorla, and J. JoeHildebrand, “JSON Web 
Encryption (JWE),” Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet-
Draft draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-11, May, 2013, work in 
progress 
